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We consider a vertically related market characterized by down-
stream imperfect competition and by the monopolistic provision of
an essential facility-based input, whose price is set by a social-welfare
maximizing regulator. Our model shows that the regulatory knowl-
edge about the cost for providing the monopolistic input crucially af-
fects the design of the optimal industry structure. In particular, we
compare ownership separation, which prevents a single company from
having the control of both upstream and downstream operations, and
legal separation, under which these activities are legally unbundled but
common ownership is allowed. As long as the regulator has full infor-
mation, the two industry patterns yield the same social welfare level.
However, under asymmetric information about the input costs legal
separation can make the whole society better o¤.
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1. Introduction
The large-scale liberalization process occurred over last decades has a¤ected
many sectors where naturally monopolistic and potentially competitive ac-
tivities are vertically related. This is often the case, for instance, in network
industries, like the electricity, natural gas, railways and water utilities. The
supply of the service to nal consumers, which admits competition at least
to some extent, requires the use of an essential facility-based input - the
network - provided by a monopolistic rm.
One of the most interesting issues in policy debates is how to design
the industry structure following the liberalization process. In practice, this
question has received di¤erent answers. The Electricity Act of 1989 divided
the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) of England and Wales,
which operated as a vertically integrated statutory monopoly, in four pub-
lic limited companies and transmission grid activities were separated from
generation. The same approach was followed in USA, where, after some
important legislative measures, the Order 888 issued by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) in 1996 mandated that owners of regional
transmission networks act as common carriers of electric power. Rather
than having one vertically integrated provider of electricity, retail customers
can now access the wholesale power market directly and purchase unbun-
dled distribution and transmission services from their local utility to deliver
power.
On the contrary, in 1984 British Telecommunications (BT) was priva-
tized as a vertically integrated monopoly and only in 1995 there was the
accounting separation of its operations into network and retail businesses.
Also the privatization of British Gas (BG) in 1986 occurred without restruc-
turing. Even though the government did not follow the 1993 Monopolies and
Mergers Commissions recommendation for breaking up the company, now
BG provides its pipeline services through a separate unit.1
More recently, the European Union has focused on the design of mar-
ket structure in network industries. The European directives 2009/72/EC
and 2009/73/EC,2 which concern common rules for the internal market in
electricity and natural gas respectively, provide that a transmission system
owner, which is part of a vertically integrated undertaking, must be inde-
1Newberry [10] provides a precise account of the most important regulatory reforms
of network utilities in the USA and the UK. See also the overview of Viscusi, Harrington
and Vernon [13], which focuses on the case of the United States.
2These directives, issued on 13 July 2009, repeal the directives 2003/54/EC and
2003/55/EC.
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pendent at least in terms of its legal form, organization and decision-making
from other activities not relating to transmission. These rules do not create
an obligation to separate the ownership of assets of the transmission sys-
tem from the other activities, even though the European Commission had
strongly recommended the actual separation of production from network
services.
This discussion emphasizes that we can identify two main approaches
to the problem of designing the industry structure in markets where regu-
lated and competitive activities are vertically related. The rst one, which
prohibits the upstream regulated monopolist from participating (directly
or indirectly) in the downstream competitive segment, is known as owner-
ship separation. The alternative solution, according to which upstream and
downstream operations must be legally unbundled but common ownership
is allowed, is dened as legal separation. As Vickers points out, despite
its importance for policy, the question of whether a regulated monopolist
should be allowed also to operate in a vertically related industry has re-
ceived relatively little theoretical attention [12, p. 16].
This paper aims at giving a contribution to the debate about the choice
of the type of unbundling to implement in vertically related markets and
advancing some policy suggestions.3
The topic is so broad and complex that it cannot be treated in an ex-
haustive way. We want to address only some relevant aspects of the problem
at hand. Vogelgang [14] stresses that asymmetric information between reg-
ulators and regulated rms, despite its importance for the access pricing
in network industries, has so far played a minor role in the policy debate.
Armstrong and Sappington also have recently recognized that further re-
search is warranted on the design of regulatory policy in vertically-integrated
industries when regulators are less omniscient [4, p. 1684].
We intend to investigate how the presence of limited regulatory knowl-
edge about the cost for providing an upstream facility-based input can a¤ect
the optimal industry structure,4 when the regulator is charged with deter-
mining the input access price paid by downstream competitive rms.
3We recognize that a way to organize such an industry is to have one vertically inte-
grated monopolist and to regulate the nal product price. However, we assume that policy
makers want to promote liberalization in potentially competitive segments, consistently
with the practical examples quoted above.
4Armstrong and Sappington [3] emphasize that there are other important issues that
should be take into account when the potential benets of legal and ownership separation
are assessed, like their di¤erent impact on the economies of scope or the quality of the
upstream input. The evaluation of these aspects is outside the scope of this paper.
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In other terms, we want to answer the following question. When the
input access price is regulated in a situation of asymmetric cost informa-
tion, is it better to have legal separation or to require ownership unbundling
between upstream and downstream operations?
Economic literature has recognized that one of the most important ben-
ets from a policy of ownership separation is the prevention of anticom-
petitive practices in the unregulated market. When it operates (directly or
indirectly) in the retail market, the input monopolist will generally antici-
pate greater prots from its downstream activities as the costs of its rivals
increase. If the regulator is uncertain about the cost for supplying the in-
put, the monopolist will seek to rise the costs of its downstream competitors
by exaggerating its input cost. Vickers [12] shows analytically that vertical
integration can complicate the regulators critical control problem, since it
increases the monopolists incentives to overstate the access costs.
In this paper we consider a vertically related industry in which two rms
- an incumbent and an entrant - compete in the downstream market. This is
of course a shortcut since in reality imperfect competition takes forms which
are much more complex. However, we believe that such an assumption is
able to capture in a simple way two main aspects that characterize down-
stream sectors in many network industries. The rst feature is the presence
of a limited number of rms which can make positive prots.5 The second
element is the existence of a dominant rm (typically monopolist before lib-
eralization) and one or more weaker competitors which have recently entered
the market.
The upstream essential input is provided by a monopoly. It is important
to stress that under either industry pattern this is the only rm which is
subject to price regulation.6 Under legal separation, the downstream in-
cumbent and the upstream monopolist belong to the same company, even
though they are independent in terms of their legal form.7 On the contrary,
ownership separation implies a stronger pattern of unbundling since the two
5Vickers [12] considers a setting where the number of downstream rms is determined
endogenously by free entry, which implies zero prots. He shows that deregulation of the
downstream sector may lead to excessive entry and duplication of the xed costs.
6 In Vickerss [12] model, also the monopolists prots arising from the downstream
competitive activity are constrained by regulatory arrangements. However, as Vickers
himself recognizes, regulatory bodies in the UK and elsewhere generally control only the
monopolistic activities and allow the rm independently to operate in the deregulated
sector, without a¤ecting the outcome of competition there.
7Empirical evidence shows that in most cases the company which runs the infrastruc-
ture segment is actually dominant also in the downstream sector when it is allowed to
operate there.
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undertakings cannot be subject to the same control.
In such a setting, our model shows that the two industry regimes yield the
same social welfare level as long as the regulator is fully informed about the
input costs. However, we nd that the presence of asymmetric information
can make it more desirable to implement legal separation. The idea is that
the upstream monopolists greater prot from exaggerating input costs can
be (at least in part) o¤set by the losses of the downstream branch which pays
a higher access price. Consequently, a trade-o¤ occurs between the incentive
to overstate the input costs and the incentive to understate. This relaxes the
regulators critical control problem and increases (expected) social welfare.
The policy implication of our model is that ownership separation should
not be thought of as the best solution to mitigate the upstream monopolists
incentive to overstate its costs. Indeed, we nd that legal separation creates
countervailing incentives within the vertical group that the regulator can
exploit to make the society better o¤.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe the ba-
sic structures of the model. Section 3 compares the outcomes under legal
and ownership unbundling in the benchmark case of complete information.
In Section 4 we study how the presence of asymmetric information can af-
fect the choice between the two regimes. This enables us to draw policy
recommendations. Section 5 is devoted to some concluding remarks.
2. Basic structures
We examine a vertically related industry which supplies a single homoge-
neous nal product, whose inverse demand function is given by
p (Q) =   Q, (2.1)
where Q denotes total quantity in the downstream market and ;  > 0
are parameters.





The downstream market is characterized by an incumbent rm and an
entrant, whose prots are respectively equal to
I (qI ; Q; a) = [p (Q)  c  a] qI (2.3)
and
5
E (qE ; Q; a) = [p (Q)  c  a] qE , (2.4)
where Q  qI + qE . Expressions (2.3) and (2.4) show that the per-unit
prot of each rm is given by the di¤erence between the net revenue from the
marketplace (p  c) and the cost a incurred to purchase the access service.
The level of downstream marginal costs c is constant and common to both
producers.8
Notice that both rms incur a payment a per unit of input to the up-
stream monopolist. What we are implicitly assuming is that they cannot
bypass the monopolists access service, so that exactly one unit of upstream
input is needed for each unit of the nal product.9
The upstream regulated monopolist, which provides the access to a cru-
cial input (the network), has a prot equal to
N (Q; a; S) = (a  cu)Q+ S, (2.5)
which is the sum of the net gain received from the two downstream rms
plus a subsidy S ? 0. The supply of the upstream service implies a constant
marginal cost cu.10
Under legal unbundling, the downstream incumbent and the upstream
monopolist are separate only in legal terms. In fact, they constitue a single
vertical group, whose aggregate prot from (2.3) and (2.5) is given by
V (qI ; qE ; a; S)  I + N = [p (Q)  c  cu] qI + (a  cu) qE + S. (2.6)
We assume that the access price a and the subsidy S are set by a benev-
olent regulator, which is charged with maximizing social welfare W , dened
as the sum of the consumerssurplus, the downstream rmsprots and the
upstream monopolists prots minus the subsidy S. Formally, we have
W  CS + I + E + N   S, (2.7)
8This is clearly a simplication as rms are likely to have di¤erent costs. However, such
an assumption should not undermine our results in terms of social welfare comparison.
9When downstream rms have some ability to substitute away from the monopolists
input, their constant marginal cost ' (a) for producing a unit of their own retail service
is no longer equal to a + c [which implies  
00




10We can imagine that there are xed costs upstream which make the activity naturally
monopolistic. However, these costs are not excessively large in relation to consumers
valuation of the product, so that they do not play no role in the analysis and can be
ignored.
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where  2 [0; 1] is a weight on monopoly earnings, which reects the
regulators distributional concern in favour of consumers and rms which
operate in the competitive market. It is important to stress that under legal
separation the agency still regulates only the upstream rm, since it repre-
sents the legal entity charged with monopoly operations, while downstream
activities occur in a liberalized market. Notice also that the downstream
rms count as consumers for social welfare. The idea is that the regula-
tor nds it so important to have competition as to give the prots of the
downstream rms the same weight as consumerssurplus.
Our regulatory model can be represented as a sequential game. At the
rst stage, the regulator makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er of a regulatory
mechanism fa; Sg, which the upstream monopolist can either accept or re-
ject. If the rm refuses the proposed policy the regulatory interaction ends.
In case of acceptance, at the second stage the downstream incumbent deter-
mines its production and at the last stage another rm decides to enter the
market.
3. Complete information
To study in a suitable way the impact of the regulatory knowledge about
the input costs on the choice between legal and ownership separation, we
rst derive the regulatory outcomes under both regimes in the benchmark
case of complete information.
3.1. Legal separation
Applying the backward induction procedure, we start by deriving the en-
trants strategy at the last stage. Substituting (2.1) into (2.4), we can write
down the entrants maximization problem as follows
max
qE
(  qE   qI   c  a)  qE . (3.1.1)
The rst-order condition for qE immediately yields the entrants best
reply function
qE (qI ; a) =
1
2
(  qI   c  a) . (3.1.2)
Using (2.6) and (3.1.2), the maximization problem of the vertical group





    qI   c  a
2






(a  cu) (  qI   c  a) + S. (3.1.3)




(  c  cu) = 0. (3.1.4)





(  c  cu) , (3.1.5)
where    c   cu  0, which is the di¤erence between the consumers
maximum willingness to pay  and the total (marginal) costs (c+ cu), can
be interpreted as the whole market size. Not surprisingly, the quantity
supplied by the vertical group does not depend on the access charge a,
which represents a mere internal transfer for the entire group.




(  c+ cu   2a) . (3.1.6)
It is immediate to see from (3.1.6) that entrants quantity decreases with
a, since the input price represents a cost for the rm.
At the rst stage, the regulator has to determine the access price a and
the transfer S in order to maximize social welfare, as dened by (2.7). Using





























s:t: (PCC), (PCE), (PCI), (PCN ),
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where (PCC), (PCE), (PCI) and (PCN ) are nonnegative utility con-
straints which guarantee the participation in the market of the consumers,
the entrant, and the downstream and upstream branches of the vertical
group, respectively. Notice that both parts of the aggregate rm are as-
sumed to receive a nonnegative prot, since they are independent in terms
of their legal form.
We can replace the policy instrument S with N , since from (2.5) there is
a bijective correspondence between the two variables for a given a. Ignoring
all the participation constraints but (PCN ),11 the regulators maximization




















+ (a  cu)  3  3c  c
u   2a
4
  (1  )N (3.1.8)
s:t: (PCN ).
Notice that the objective function in (3.1.8) is decreasing in N , so the
regulator nds it optimal to give zero prots to the branch of the vertical
group which provides the essential input (LSN = 0).




(3  3c  cu   2a)  1
8
(3  3c  cu   2a)+
  1
8
(  c+ cu   2a)+ 1
4
(3  3c  cu   2a)  1
2
(a  cu) = 0. (3.1.9)
From (3.1.9) we can derive the complete-information optimal access
charge under legal separation, which may be written after some manipu-
lations as
aLS = cu   1
2
(  c  cu) . (3.1.10)
11 It can be easily seen that they are all satised in equilibrium.
9
It is immediate to see from (3.1.10) that in equilibrium the input price
aLS is below its marginal cost cu. In other terms, the regulator nds it
optimal to subsidize the input access. As we will see, the access pricing policy
below costs is designed to o¤set the potential distortion of the (unregulated)
downstream price arising from the presence of imperfect competition.12





(  c  cu) . (3.1.11)
Notice from (3.1.11) and (3.1.5) that in equilibrium the entrant and the
vertical group will produce the same quantity in the downstream market.
The subsidization of the access charge denitely benets the entrant, which
can increase its production and o¤set its strategic disadvantage with respect
to the rival.
Substituting (3.1.5) and (3.1.11) into (2.1) we nd that nal consumers
pay a price equal to
pLS = c+ cu, (3.1.12)
so that the marginal cost pricing is implemented. Even if it cannot
intervene directly in the liberalized downstream sector, the regulator charges
an input price below costs which eliminates any allocative ine¢ ciency arising
from imperfect competition.
If we replace (3.1.11) and (3.1.5) into (2.4) and (2.6) respectively and








(  c  cu)2 . (3.1.13)
12This access pricing policy can be implemented as long as transfers to the monopolist
are feasible. Armstrong and Sappington [3] warn against the use of this sort of subsidies
in the long-run, because they introduce at least two important problems. First, subsidized
access to infrastructure can distort the technological choices of the competitor if the latter
decides to use the existing network even though it would employ fewer social resources
by building and running its own infrastructure. This issue refers to the provision to the
entrant of the right make-or-buy incentives. Second, subsidies may permit an ine¢ cient
rm to operate protably in the market, thereby increasing industry costs and reducing
social welfare. Indeed, following the e¢ cient component pricing rule (ECPR) - of which
Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers [1] give a brilliant synthesis - the access price which prevents
ine¢ cient entry should be equal in our setting to aLSECPR = c
u, that is the di¤erence
between the direct cost of proving access (cu) minus the opportunity cost of proving
access (p   c   cu = 0, since p = c + cu, as we will see below). However, neither the
possibly ine¢ cient by-pass nor the threat of ine¢ cient entry are considered in our model.
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The two downstream rms earn the same prot in equilibrium. This is
a straightforward consequence of the even division of the market between
them and of the unprotability of monopoly regulated operations for the
vertical group.




(  c  cu)2 , (3.1.14)
which is increasing in the market size.




(  c  cu)2 . (3.1.15)
Notice that (3.1.15) is equal to the sum of the prots in (3.1.13) of the
two downstream rms. Hence, the transfer to the upstream monopolist
indirectly nances the prots of its branch in the competitive market and
those of its rival.
Using (3.1.13), (3.1.14) and (3.1.15), we can compute the complete-




(  c  cu)2 . (3.1.16)
It appears from (3.1.16) and (3.1.14) that social welfare is equal to the
consumerssurplus.
3.2. Ownership separation
To solve the regulatory game under ownership separation we adopt again
the backward induction procedure. While (3.1.2) at the last stage still holds,
the second-stage maximization problem of the incumbent in the downstream
market must be reformulated, since the leader is now a separate rm which
is independent from the upstream monopolist even in terms of ownership.




    qI   c  a
2
  qI   c  a

 qI . (3.2.1)




(  c  a) = 0. (3.2.2)
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(  c  a) . (3.2.3)
Notice from (3.2.3) that now the incumbent also incurs the essential




(  c  a) . (3.2.4)
At the rst stage, using (3.2.3) and (3.2.4) the regulators maximization


























s:t: (PCC), (PCE), (PCI), (PCN ).
Ignoring all the participation constraints but (PCN )13 and replacing from
















 3 (  c  a)
4
+
+(a  cu)  3 (  c  a)
4
  (1  )N . (3.2.6)
s:t: (PCN ).
Since the objective function in (3.2.6) is decreasing in N , the regulator
nds it optimal to give zero prots to the input monopolist (OSN = 0).
The rst-order condition for a is given by
  9
16
(  c  a)  3
16
(  c  a)  3
16
(  c  a)+





(  c  a)  3
4
(a  cu) = 0. (3.2.7)
After some manipulations, the complete-information access charge under
ownership separation can be written as
aOS = cu   1
3
(  c  cu) . (3.2.8)
We can immediately see from (3.2.8) that even under ownership un-
bundling the input price is below its costs in equilibrium. A comparison
between (3.2.8) and (3.1.10) reveals that aLS < aOS and so the price dis-
tortion below marginal costs is higher under legal separation. To reach
its objective of minimization of allocative ine¢ ciency in the downstream
market, the regulator nds it optimal to subsidize access more when the
downstream imperfect competition is further undermined by the (indirect)
participation of the monopolist in the retail market. This is because in such
a case only the quantity in (3.1.6) produced by the entrant depends on the
regulated input price, while under ownership separation the regulator can
(indirectly) a¤ect the outputs in (3.2.3) and (3.2.4) of both rms and then
the need for subsidizing the access service is lower.
Substituting (3.2.8) into (3.2.3) and (3.2.4) we nd the quantities sup-









(  c  cu) . (3.2.10)
Notice that under ownership unbundling the dominant rm produces
more than the entrant in the downstream sector, since now both rms benet
from access subsidization and the incumbent can fully exploit its dominant
position in the market. Consequently, as emerges from the comparison of
(3.2.9) and (3.2.10) with (3.1.5) and (3.1.11) respectively, in equilibrium the
independent incumbent supplies a higher quantity than the vertical group
(qOSI > q
LS





Substituting (3.2.9) and (3.2.10) into (2.1) we nd the downstream mar-
ket price, which is equal to
pOS = pLS = c+ cu. (3.2.11)
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Expression (3.2.11) shows that the marginal cost pricing applies under
both regimes. This means that the total production is unchanged and the
industry pattern only a¤ects the allocation of the output between the two
rms in equilibrium.










(  c  cu)2 . (3.2.13)
Consistently with the results in (3.2.9) and (3.2.10), ownership separa-
tion allows the incumbent to earn more than the entrant, even if both rms
bear a reduction in their prots relative to the case of legal unbundling
[compare (3.2.12) and (3.2.13) with (3.1.13)]. The rationale is that now the
higher input cost erodes the rms prot margin, while the nal price is
unchanged.




(  c  cu)2 . (3.2.14)
After a quick look at (3.2.14) and (3.1.14) we get the following result.
Lemma 1 When the regulator has full information about a vertically related
market, the legal and ownership unbundling between the upstream monopolist
and the downstream incumbent yield the same consumerssurplus.
The result in Lemma 1 is a straightforward consequence of (3.2.11).





(  c  cu)2 . (3.2.15)
Notice that (3.2.15) is equal to the sum of (3.2.12) and (3.2.13). Also
the subsidy under ownership separation - which is lower than that under
legal separation in (3.1.15) - just matches the prots of the two downstream
rms.
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Using (3.2.12), (3.2.13), (3.2.14) and (3.2.15), we can now compute the




(  c  cu)2 . (3.2.16)
If we compare (3.2.16) and (3.1.16), we nd the following result.
Lemma 2 When the regulator has full information about a vertically related
market, the legal and ownership unbundling between the upstream monopolist
and the downstream incumbent yield the same social welfare level.
The result in Lemma 2 indicates that a fully-informed regulator is able
to replicate the same social-welfare outcome under both regimes by imple-
menting a di¤erent allocation of the total output between the downstream
rms through the regulation of access charge. As we will see, this conclu-
sion no longer holds when the monopolist can use strategically its private
information about the input costs.
4. Asymmetric cost information
The observations emphasized in Lemmas 1 and 2 have been derived under
the condition that the regulator is fully informed. As Baron and Myerson
argue, this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality, since the rm
would be expected to have better information than would the regulator
[6, p. 911].
We suppose now that there is asymmetric information about the up-
stream marginal costs cu.14 The revelation principle ensures that, without
any loss of generality, the regulator may be restricted to direct incentive
compatible policies, which require the rm to report its cost parameter and
which give the rm no incentive to lie.15 The regulatory problem can be
reduced to the design of a mechanism M =

a (bcu) ; S (bcu) ;bcu 2 cu ; cu+	,
which determines the access charge a (:) and the subsidy S (:) to the rm
as functions of its report bcu 2 cu ; cu+, by inducing the rm to reveal hon-
estly its private information, so that in equilibrium bcu = cu. The regulator
is supposed to have only imperfect prior knowledge about cu, represented
14See Lewis and Sappington [9] for an investigation of the optimal access tari¤s when
the regulator is uncertain about the production costs of the rm which recently entered
the market.
15For an application of the revelation principle to regulation, see the seminal paper of
Baron and Myerson [6].
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by a density function f (cu), which, to avoid technical problems, is contin-






. The corresponding cumulative
distribution function is given by F (cu) =
R cu
cu 
f (ecu) decu 2 [0; 1].
4.1. Legal separation
We know that the regime of legal unbundling implies that the upstream
monopolist and the downstream incumbent form a vertical group which
acts as a single entity, even though the two rms are separate in legal terms
and only the upstream operations are regulated.
Economic theory has emphasized that a regulated rm has a natural in-
centive to overstate its costs if the regulator ignores asymmetric information
and implements the regulatory policy discussed in the previous section. This
conclusion can be denitely applied to the upstream monopoly. To see that,
let us compute the extraprot LSN (bcu; cu) that the vertical group obtains
from its monopoly activities when declaring bcu rather than its true costs cu
LSN (bcu; cu)  LSN (bcu; cu) LSN (cu) = [a (bcu)  cu] QLS (bcu)+SLS (bcu)+
 LSN (cu) = LSN (bcu)+(bcu   cu)QLS (bcu) LSN (cu) = (bcu   cu)  c  bcu ,
(4.1.1)
where LSN (bcu)  LSN (bcu;bcu) = LSN (cu) = 0, since any type of rm
which reports the truth gets zero prots when the complete-information
regulatory policy is applied, and QLS (bcu) =  c bcu  0 is the total output
derived from (3.1.5) and (3.1.11) for cu = bcu. It is evident that the mo-
nopolist has an incentive to exaggerate its costs (bcu > cu), because doing so
guarantees positive prots [LSN (bcu; cu) > 0 if QLS (bcu) > 0].
We study now the impact of such a strategic behaviour on the down-
stream branch of the vertical group. The di¤erence in prot LSI (bcu; cu)
when bcu is reported instead of cu is given by
LSI (bcu; cu)  LSI (bcu; cu)  LSI (cu) =









(bcu   cu) [(  c  cu) + (  c  bcu)] , (4.1.2)
where the last two equalities are derived by using (3.1.12). Notice from
(4.1.2) that downstream activities benet from an understatement of the
upstream costs, as LSI (bcu; cu)  0 if bcu < cu (the bracketed expression is
the sum of two nonnegative terms). This is not surprising, since a declared
lower value for cu reduces the access charge and thus increases the prot
margin of the downstream branch.
It is evident that the vertical group faces a trade-o¤ when it lies. Ex-
aggerating the input costs will be desirable when the extraprot in the up-
stream market more than o¤sets the losses on the downstream operations.
Such is the case if and only if
LSN (bcu; cu) > LSI (bcu; cu) . (4.1.3)
Substituting (4.1.1) and (4.1.2) into (4.1.3) yields after some manipula-
tions
(bcu   cu)  (  c  bcu) > 1
3
(bcu   cu)  (  c  cu) . (4.1.4)
After dividing both sides of (4.1.4) by bcu   cu > 0, we can see that the
vertical group will nd it optimal to overstate its upstream costs if and only
if
  c  bcu




We may rewrite (4.1.5) as
bcu < cu (cu) , (4.1.6)
where cu (c
u)  23 (  c)+
1
3c
u > cu if 23 (  c)+
1
3c
u  cu+ and cu (cu) 





.16 Condition (4.1.6) shows that the vertical group will not report a
value for bcu higher than the threshold cu (cu), otherwise it would incur losses
for its statement.
16 It is important to stress that the rm does not have any incentive to understate its





which is never met (since the left-hand side is greater than one forbcu < cu).
17
We suppose that cu (c
u) = cu+ if and only if c
u = cu+, which implies that
   c   cu+ = 0.17 In other terms, the highest-cost rm is so ine¢ cient
that production cannot occur. In Figure 4.1.1 we depict graphically this
situation.18 The area above the bisecting (broken) line represents the case
of rms overstatement of its costs, that is bcu > cu. The part of the graph
under the other (solid) line captures condition (4.1.6), that is bcu < cu (cu).









Fig. 4.1.1. Incentives to lie under legal separation
Any type of the rm (with cu < cu+) is willing to report a cost parameterbcu 2 (cu; cu (cu)) which is strictly lower than cu+. This observation has crucial
implications for the following analysis.
We are ready to solve now the regulatory game. We substitute the
outcomes at the last two stages in (3.1.5) and (3.1.6), which still hold, into
















   3  3c  c
u   2a (cu)
4
  c  a (cu)

 3  3c  c
u   2a (cu)
4
+
17Such an assumption entails that there is not a continuum of the rms types that











[a (cu)  cu]  3  3c  c









(PCC), (PCE), (PCI), (PCN )
and
LSN (c







3  3c  ecu   2a (ecu)
4
decu, (ICCLSN )
where (ICCLSN ) is the incentive compatibility constraint of the network
provider under legal separation, whose formal derivation is provided in Ap-
pendix A.
We can ignore all the participation constraints but (PCN ).19 Substitut-
ing (ICCLSN ) into the objective function in (4.1.7) and replacing the choice





















   3  3c  c
u   2a (cu)
4




u   2a (cu)
4
+ [a (cu)  cu]  3  3c  c
u   2a (cu)
4
+




3  3c  ecu   2a (ecu)
4
decu   (1  )LSN (cu (cu))
9>=>; f (cu) dcu
(4.1.8)
19 It can be easily shown that they are all satised in equilibrium.
19
s:t: (PCN ).
Since the objective function in (4.1.8) is decreasing in N (cu (c
u)), the
regulator nds it optimal to set LSN (c
u
 (c
u)) = 0, still satisfying (PCN )
since the integral in (ICCLSN ) is nonnegative.
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   3  3c  c
u   2a (cu)
4




u   2a (cu)
4
+ [a (cu)  cu]  3  3c  c
u   2a (cu)
4
+
  (1  ) 20 (  c)  8c




f (cu) dcu, (4.1.9)
where H (cu)  F (c
u)
f(cu) is the hazard rate.
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The rst-order condition for a (cu) is given by
  1
8
[3  3c  cu   2a (cu)]  1
8
[3  3c  cu   2a (cu)]+
  1
8
[  c+ cu   2a (cu)] + 1
4
[3  3c  cu   2a (cu)]+
  1
2
[a (cu)  cu] + (1  ) 1
3
H (cu) = 0. (4.1.10)
20 In particular, the integral is strictly positive for cu < cu+ since the integrand function
is positive (as long as production occurs in equilibrium) and cu (c
u) > cu, while it vanishes







21The hazard rate H (cu) is supposed to be increasing in cu. This monotonicity property,
which is met by the most usual distributions, may be interpreted as a decrease in the
conditional probability that there are further cost reductions, given that there has already
been a cost marginal reduction, as the rm becomes more e¢ cient.
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After some manipulations, we derive the asymmetric-information opti-
mal access charge under legal separation
aLS (cu) = cu   1
2
(  c  cu) + 4
3
(1  )H (cu) . (4.1.11)
Not surprisingly, expression (4.1.11) is higher than (3.1.10), so the in-
put price is distorted above its complete-information level according to the
level of regulatory uncertainty, measured by H (cu),22 and the regulators
distributional concern, captured by the parameter . Hence, in principle we
cannot predict whether the input will be subsidized in equilibrium or not.
Only the most e¢ cient input provider (for which cu = cu ) will receive the




= 0] because this is the
type of the rm for which no one else wants to pass itself o¤.23 Moreover,
notice that (4.1.11) is a decreasing function of , so the more weight the
regulator gives to the monopolists prots the lower will be the price. As
emerges from (2.7), the rationale for this result arises from the loss (1  )
that the society incurs for a transfer of a unit of money to the monopolist.
Only if there is no distributional issue ( = 1), the optimal access charge
does not need to be distorted in equilibrium.











It is immediate to notice that expression (4.1.12) is lower than (3.1.11).
The higher asymmetric-information access charge results in a reduction in
the quantity produced by the entrant.
From (3.1.5) and (4.1.12) the downstream market price is equal to
pLS = c+ cu +
2
3
(1  )H (cu) . (4.1.13)
A quick look at (4.1.13) and (3.1.12) shows that the price is distorted
above the complete-information level. This is a direct consequence of the
increase in the access charge in (4.1.11). However, notice that the distortion
of the input price translates into a lower raise in the nal price.
22Notice that a mean-preserving spread of the distribution implies an increase in H for
given costs.
23This property is known in the literature as non distortion at the top and indicates
that the only e¢ cient price is that designed for the agent with the "best" characteristic.
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Now we compute the prot of the downstream branch of the vertical











Notice that expression (4.1.14) is lower than (3.1.13), which means that
the incumbent is worse o¤ because of asymmetric information. Ideed, if we
take the di¤erence between (4.1.14) and (3.1.13) we obtain
LSI  LSI   LSI =  
1
3
(  c  cu) (1  )H (cu)  0. (4.1.15)










We can easily see that the entrant is also penalized by the situation of
asymmetric information, since its prot in (4.1.16) is smaller than the one in
(3.1.13). Subtracting (3.1.13) from (4.1.16) yields after some manipulations











since the nonnegativity condition on qLSE in (4.1.12) implies that the
term in square brackets in (4.1.17) must be positive. This is the result of
two combined e¤ects. The rst one is the reduction in the quantity produced
by the entrant seen before. The second factor is the decrease in the prot
margin. Indeed, the higher downstream price from which the rm benets
is more than o¤set by the greater access price that it has to pay.
Comparing (4.1.17) and (4.1.15) immediately yields
LSE   LSI 
(as long as qLSE  0). In other words, the incumbent is relatively less pe-
nalized by the situation of asymmetric information than the entrant. The
motivation is that, even if it incurs the same reduction in the prot margin
as its competitor, the quantity in (3.1.5) is unchanged (qLSI = q
LS
I ) since it
does not depend on the access charge and thus cannot be distorted by the
regulator in equilibrium.







  c  ecu   23 (1  )H (ecu)

decu. (4.1.18)
The downward distortion of the entrants production in (4.1.12) entails
a reduction in the total output, captured by the integrand in (4.1.18), which
allows the regulator to curb the socially costly rent (if  < 1) that the
monopolist extracts for its informational advantage.
As shown in Appendix C, expression (4.1.18) satises the standard prop-
erty of decreasing monotonocity in cu. This corresponds to the intuitive
notion that the prot should increase in the e¢ ciency of the rm.












The situation of asymmetric information makes the consumers worse
o¤, since their utility in (4.1.19) is lower than that in (3.1.14). The gains
from reducing the informational rents in (4.1.18) come at the expense of a
decrease in the consumerssurplus, since they imply allocative ine¢ ciency.







  c  ecu   23 (1  )H (ecu)











Notice that (4.1.20) may be less than zero for values of cu high enough,
since the integral is quite low and the last term is likely to be negative. This
means that, unlike in the complete-information case, the regulator may nd
it optimal to tax rather than subsidize the monopolist in exchange for a
higher price.
Using (4.1.14), (4.1.16), (4.1.18), (4.1.19) and (4.1.20), we derive after


















  c  ecu   23 (1  )H (ecu)

decu. (4.1.21)
It is immediate to see from (4.1.21) and (3.1.16) that the situation of
asymmetric information is social-welfare detrimental, as long as the reg-
ulator has some distributional concern ( < 1). There are two elements
of distortion with respect to the complete-information case. The rst one,
captured by the term in square brackets, concerns the reduction in the con-
sumers surplus and in the downstream rmsprots. The second factor,
represented by the integral, refers to the part of the informational rent of
the monopolist which represents a mere loss from the social-welfare point of
view.
4.2. Ownership separation
The existence of asymmetric information does not change the outcomes
at the last two stages of the regulatory game. Hence, still applying the
backward induction procedure, we substitute (3.2.3) and (3.2.4) into (2.7)
and write down the regulators maximization problem when the privately-
informed upstream monopolist is independent of the downstream incumbent
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  c  a (ecu)
4
decu. (ICCOSN )
In Appendix E we give some details about (ICCOSN ), which represents the
incentive compatibility constraint of the network provider under ownership
separation.
We can ignore all the participation constraints but (PCN ).24 After sub-
stituting (ICCOSN ) into the objective function in (4.2.1), we replace from






















  3  c  a (c
u)
4
  c  a (cu)


3  c  a (c
u)
4




  (1  )  3  c  a (c
u)
4




f (cu) dcu. (4.2.2)
s:t: (PCN ).










= 0], still satisfying (PCN ).
The rst-order condition for a (cu) is equal to
  9
16
[  c  a (cu)]  3
16
[  c  a (cu)]  3
16




[  c  a (cu)]  3
4
[a (cu)  cu] + 3
4
(1  )H (cu) = 0. (4.2.3)
After some computations, we nd the asymmetric-information access
charge under owership separation
24 It can be easily seen that they are all satised in equilibrium.
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aOS (cu) = cu   1
3
(  c  cu) + 4
3
(1  )H (cu) . (4.2.4)
It appears from (4.2.4) and (3.2.7) that even under ownership unbundling
the optimal input price is set above the complete-information level. Notice
from (4.2.4) and (4.1.11) that the di¤erence between the access charges un-
der the two regimes is the same as that with complete information, since the
regulator applies the same distortion [equal to 43 (1  )H (c
u)] in response
to the asymmetric-information problem. This result is a bit surprising. We
have argued in Section 3.2 that the complete-information input price is less
distorted below the marginal cost under ownership separation because the
regulator can (indirectly) a¤ect the outputs of both downstream rms rather
than only that of the entrant in order to minimize allocative ine¢ ciency.
Following this reasoning, we would have expected a lower distortion arising
from asymmetric information under owership separation. Then, why does
not this occur in equilibrium? One possible answer is that ceteris paribus -
that is, before considering the di¤erent impact of the regulatory policy in the
two regimes on the quantities produced - the regulators need for distort-
ing the price upwards is actually higher under ownership separation than
under legal separation. We recognize that this explanation is incomplete
and a bit cryptic, but its rationale will become clearer when we compare
the informational rents received by the monopolist under the two industry
regimes.





[  c  cu   (1  )H (cu)] . (4.2.5)
It is immediate to see from (4.2.5) and (3.2.8) that the higher input price
leads to a reduction in the production of the incumbent under asymmetric
information.
Taking the di¤erence between (4.2.5) and (3.1.5) we nd that qOSI >
qLSI = q
LS
I if and only if
  c  cu   4 (1  )H (cu) > 0. (4.2.6)
Notice that condition (4.2.6) holds when the access charge in (4.2.4) is
distorted below the marginal cost (aOS < cu). In other terms, the incum-
bent will produce more under ownership separation as long as the input is
subsidized. This may not be the case under asymmetric information, so
26
we cannot predict under which regime the incumbents production will be
higher.





[  c  cu   (1  )H (cu)] . (4.2.7)
A quick look at (4.2.7) and (3.2.9) shows that the entrant will produce
less because of the asymmetric-information problem.
If we subtract (4.1.12) from (4.2.7) we nd that qOSE > q
LS
E if and only if
  c  cu   2 (1  )H (cu) < 0. (4.2.8)
Condition (4.2.8) is satised for H high enough. Therefore, we can state
that a su¢ ciently high level of regulatory uncertainty implies that the en-
trant will produce more under owership separation because of the greater
downward distortion of its quantity that occurs under legal unbundling [see
from (4.2.7) and (4.1.12) that 43 (1  )H (c
u)  (1  )H (cu)]. Put an-
other way, the advantage of a higher input subsidization that the entrant
enjoys under legal separation in the case of complete information is more
than o¤set by a decrease in quantity under asymmetric information when
the level of regulatory uncertainty is high enough.
It is also important to stress that conditions (4.2.6) and (4.2.8) cannot
be satised simultaneously. Hence, under neither regime both downstream
rms can increase their quantities.
If we substitute (4.2.5) and (4.2.7) into (2.1) we derive the price in the
downstream market
pOS = c+ cu + (1  )H (cu) . (4.2.9)
As under legal separation, the increase in the access charge in (4.2.4)
arising from asymmetric information yields a lower distortion in the nal
price. More importantly, we see from (4.2.9) and (4.1.13) that consumers
are worse o¤ under ownership separation, since they pay a higher price. The
rationale for this result will be analyzed when we derive the monopolists
informational rents.
Replacing (4.2.4), (4.2.5) and (4.2.9) into (2.3), we can compute the




[  c  cu   (1  )H (cu)]2 . (4.2.10)
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It is immediate to see from (4.2.10) and (3.2.11) that the asymmetric
information problem penalizes the incumbent. If we take the di¤erence
between (4.2.10) and (3.2.11) we nd
OSI  OSI  OSI =
2
9
(1  )H (cu) [(1  )H (cu)  2 (  c  cu)]  0,
(4.2.10)
since downstream quantities in (4.2.5) and (4.2.7) must be nonnegative.




[  c  cu   (1  )H (cu)]2 . (4.2.11)
Not surprisingly, the entrant also is worse o¤ under asymmetric infor-
mation. Subtracting (3.2.12) from (4.2.11) yields
OSE  OSE  OSE =
1
9
(1  )H (cu) [(1  )H (cu)  2 (  c  cu)]  0.
(4.2.12)
It appears from (4.2.12) and (4.2.10) that the incumbent is more penal-
ized than the entrant by asymmetric information. This is the opposite of
what we found under legal separation. The rationale is that now both rms
incur a reduction in their prot margin and output, so the incumbent will
su¤er relatively more from the problem of asymmetric information.





  c  ecu   (1  )H (ecu)

decu. (4.2.13)
Notice that the range between boundaries of the integral in (4.2.13) is
higher than that in (4.1.18), as cu+ > c
u
 (c







is that under ownership separation the monopolist with costs cu has an
incentive to report bcu 2  cu; cu+, i.e. to mimic every more ine¢ cient type
of the rm, and it has to be accordingly remunerated in order to reveal the
truth. Under legal separation, this incentive is weaker, since the network
provider does not nd it protable to declare bcu > cu (cu). This implies
a higher distortion of total output under ownership separation in order to
curb the monopolists informational rents, as is evident from the comparison
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between the integrand functions in (4.2.13) and (4.1.18). Consequently,
consumers will pay higher prices, as we found in (4.2.9).
Subtracting (4.1.18) from (4.2.13) we get after some manipulations













H (ecu) decu. (4.2.14)
The sign of (4.2.14) is ambiguous. This is the outcome of the trade-o¤
between the higher incentive to lie under ownership separation, which leads
ceteris paribus to an increase in the informational rent, and the greater
downward distortion in the total output, which is aimed at achieving the







  c  cu (cu) 
2
3
(1  )H (cu (cu))

 0, (4.2.15)
since the expression (4.2.15) is the opposite of total output under legal
separation when we replace cu with cu (c
u). This result shows that the
di¤erence in the informational rents under the two regimes reduces as the
highest possible cost overstatement under legal separation cu (c
u) increases
and thus approaches cu+ which is the highest cost that the monopolist is
willing to report under ownership unbundling.






[  c  cu   (1  )H (cu)]2 . (4.2.16)
A comparison (4.2.16) and (4.1.19) gives the following result.
Proposition 3 When the regulator has asymmetric information about the
production costs of the upstream monopolist in a vertically related market, -
nal consumers benet from the legal separation between the input monopolist
and the downstream incumbent.
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This is a straightforward consequence of the greater output distortion
which occurs under ownership separation.







  c  ecu   (1  )H (ecu)

decu +   c  cu   (1  )H (cu)
3

 [  c  cu   4 (1  )H (cu)] . (4.2.17)
Notice that even under ownership separation the regulator may nd it
optimal to tax rather than subsidize the monopolist. This can occur when
the rm is highly ine¢ cient.
Substituting (4.2.10), (4.2.11), (4.2.13), (4.2.16) and (4.2.17) into (2.7),
we derive after some computations the asymmetric-information social wel-







(  c  cu)2   (1  )2H2 (cu)
i
+
  (1  ) 
cu+Z
cu
  c  ecu   (1  )H (ecu)

decu. (4.2.18)
From (4.2.18) and (4.1.21) we can see that the presence of asymmetric
information still produces two e¤ects. The rst one, which appears in the
expression in square brackets, concerns the distortion in total output. Not
surprisingly, the bracketed term in (4.2.18) is lower than that in (4.1.21).
The second factor, which is captured by the integral, refers to the monopo-
lists information rent. Consistently with what we found before, we cannot
know a priori whether this e¤ect is stronger under ownership or legal sepa-
ration.
A comparison between the expected values of social welfare under the
two regimes yields a relevant result, which is summarized in the following
Proposition.
Proposition 4 When the regulator has asymmetric information about the
production costs of the upstream monopolist in a vertically related market,
the regime of legal separation between the upstream monopolist and the down-
stream incumbent yields a higher expected social welfare level.
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The proof is shown in Appendix F. Proposition 4 emphasizes that when
the regulator has limited knowledge of the industry it is desirable from an
expected social welfare viewpoint to separate the input monopolist from the
downstream incumbent just in legal terms so that they can still belong to
the same company. Such a kind of separation, unlike the ownership one,
generates a trade-o¤ between the incentive to exaggerate private informa-
tion by the monopolist in order to have higher prots and the incentive to
understate this information by the downstream rm in order to pay a lower
access charge. Hence, legal separation yields countervailing incentives within
the vertical group which allow the regulator to reduce the output distortion
to curb informational rents. The higher allocative e¢ ciency, emphasized in
Proposition 3, leads to a greater expected social welfare level.
The result in Proposition 4 has crucial implications. Often in the lit-
erature and policy debates the regime of ownership separation between the
input monopolist and the downstream incumbent is thought of as the best
solution to the regulators critical control problem, since it should remove
the monopolists practice of exaggerating the input costs in order to worsen
the competitiveness of the downstream rivals. However, the monopolists
incentives to exploit its private information still play a relevant role. Our
model shows that legal separation can be (expected) social welfare improv-
ing, since it creates a conict of interests within the vertical group, which
reduces the negative e¤ects of asymmetric information.
5. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have dealt with the problem of how to design the industry
structure in a vertically related market when the regulator is charged with
setting the price for the access to an upstream monopolistic input and there
is imperfect competition downstream. Although the literature on the access
pricing is quite extensive, this is an issue that, despite its importance after
the liberalization process, has been by and large ignored in the economic
research.
Empirical evidence shows that there are two main industry patterns
that have so far been implemented. Under legal separation upstream and
downstream operations are legally unbundled but common ownership is per-
mitted. In contrast, ownership separation prevents a single company from
controlling both activities. We have studied the impact on social welfare gen-
erated by these two industry structures of a problem that has so far played
a minor role in the policy debate about access pricing: the asymmetric in-
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formation about the industry on the part of the regulator. We have found
that, while under complete information the two regimes yield the same social
welfare, regulatory limited knowledge about the monopolists input costs im-
plies that legal separation is (expected) social welfare improving. The idea
is that a trade-o¤ occurs between the monopolists incentive to overstate its
costs in order to get higher prots and incentive of the downstream branch
to understate them to pay a lower access charge. The policy implication of
this result is that owership separation should not be considered as the best
solution to deal with the problem of the monopolists incentive to raise the
input costs. Under legal separation the regulator can exploit the conict of
interests that emerges between the two branches of the vertical group and
reduce the detrimental e¤ects of asymmetric information.
We believe that the analysis can be extended in a variety of directions.
We would like to mention three suggestions which are left for future research.
First of all, we have considered only two downstream rms, one incum-
bent and one entrant. However, in the literature imperfect competition is
usually captured by assuming a dominant rm and a competitive fringe
which makes zero prot. Would our results change in this case?
Other development would be to examine a more realistic setting where
the regulator is uncertain not only on the costs of the upstream monopolist
but also on those of the downstream rms.
Finally, it would be interesting to investigate in our setting the issues
of the possible by-pass of the infrastructure by entrants and the impact on
production e¢ ciency of increased competition.
Appendix A
We derive now the incentive compatibility constraint (ICCN ) of the network
provider for the prot function in (2.5) and show that this represents a local
necessary condition which is also globally su¢ cient in equilibrium if Q (cu)
is nonincreasing.
The class of global incentive compatible mechanisms must satisfy the
following set of conditions
N (c
u; cu)  N (cu)  N (bcu; cu) , 8bcu; cu 2 cu ; cc+ . (A.1)
In order to induce a rm not to lie, the prot N (cu; cu) obtained by
telling the truth has to be at least as great as the prot N (bcu; cu) that the
rm could get for any report bcu.
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Following the Baron [5] approach, we use (2.5) and rewrite N (bcu; cu)
as
N (bcu; cu) = [a (bcu)  cu] Q (bcu) + S (bcu) = N (bcu) + (bcu   cu) Q (bcu) ,
(A.2)
where N (bcu)  N (bcu;bcu). Substituting N (bcu; cu) from (A.2) into
(A.1) and combining terms yields
N (c
u)  N (bcu)  (bcu   cu) Q (bcu) , 8bcu; cu 2 cu ; cu+ . (A.3)
Reversing the roles of cu and bcu implies
N (c
u)  N (bcu)  (bcu   cu) Q (cu) , 8bcu; cu 2 cu ; cu+ . (A.4)
Since (A.3) and (A.4) must hold simultaneously for any 8bcu; cu 2 cu ; cu+,
we may write
(bcu   cu) Q (bcu)  N (cu)  N (bcu)  (bcu   cu) Q (cu) .
If we divide by bcu   cu > 0 and take the limit as bcu ! cu we get by




=  Q (cu) . (A.5)
Since a derivative is a local property of a function, (A.5) is a local condi-
tion which indicates that for any incentive compatible mechanism the prot
of the rm viewed across the possible types is a decreasing function of cu.
By integrating both sides in (A.5), we nd the local necessary condition for
the incentive compatibility (ICCLSN ) seen in the paper
N (c







Q (ecu) decu, (A.6)
where Q (ecu) = 3 3c ecu 2a(ecu)4 .




@Q@cu < 0 (
@2N (Q;c
u)
@Q@cu > 0, respectively), then the function Q (c
u)
is implementable, or glabally incentive compatible, if it is monotone nonin-
creasing (nondecreasing, respectively). In equilibrium we have N (cu (c
u)) =
33
0, so condition (A.6) boils down to LSN (c
u) =
R cu (cu)










cu Q (ecu) decui = @@cu [cu (cu)  cu] = 13   1 =  23 <
0, then condition (A.6) is globally incentive compatible if Q (cu) is nonin-
creasing.
Appendix B
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3  3c  ecu   2a
4
decudcu. (B.1)









= 0. If we apply some properties of the integrals and the Torricelli-
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3  3c  ecu   2a
4
decu, (B.2)
where k is a constant which belongs to (cu; cu (c
u)).
The Torricelli-Barrow theorem and the chain rule imply that the second
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3  3c  ecu   2a
4
decuf (cu) dcu = cu+R
cu 
































  c  ecu   23 (1  )H (ecu)

decu# , (C.1)
where k is a constant which belongs to interval (cu; cu (c
u)). If we apply























































As qLSE  0 the expression in square brackets in (C.3) is positive, so LSN
is decreasing in cu.
Appendix E
To derive (ICCOSN ), which represents a local necessary condition of the incen-
tive compatibility, we follow exactly the same procedure as that in Appendix









Q (ecu) decu, (E.1)
where Q (ecu) = 3 c a(ecu)4 .














= 0   1 =  1 < 0, then condition (E.1) is globally incentive
compatible if Q (cu) is nonincreasing.
Appendix F
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9>=>; f (cu) dcu. (F.1)


























9>=>; f (cu) dcu. (F.2)
Notice that su¢ cient condition for (F.2) to be positive for  2 [0; 1) is






































where the last inequality arises from the Torricelli-Barrow theorem and
the chain rule.
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Using (F.3), the su¢ cient condition for (F.2) to be positive becomes after











H (cu)F (cu)  1
3





As H (cu)  F (c
u)
f(cu) , it is immediate to see that the expression on the
left-hand side is greater than the rst addend on the right-hand side. The
increasing monotonicity of the hazard rate implies that the second term in
curly brackets is positive, so we can conclude that (F.4) is always satised.
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